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Self-Love and Sociability: The ‘Rudiments of Commerce’ in the State 
of Nature 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Istvan Hont’s classic work on the theoretical links between the seventeenth-century 
natural jurists Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf and the eighteenth-century 
Scottish political economists remains a popular trope among intellectual and 
economic historians of various stamps. Despite this, a common criticism levelled at 
Hont remains his relative lack of engagement with the relationship between religion 
and economics in the early modern period. This paper challenges this aspect of Hont’s 
narrative by drawing attention to an alternative, albeit complementary, assessment of 
the natural jurisprudential heritage of eighteenth-century British political economy. 
Specifically, the article attempts to map on to Hont’s thesis the Christian Stoic 
interpretation of Grotius and Pufendorf which has gained greater currency in recent 
years. In doing so, the paper argues that Grotius and Pufendorf’s contributions to the 
‘unsocial sociability’ debate do not necessarily lead directly to the Scottish school of 
political economists, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it contends that a 
reconsideration of Grotius and Pufendorf as neo-Stoic theorists, particularly via 
scrutiny of their respective adaptations of the traditional Stoic theory of oikeiosis, 
steers us towards the heart of the early English ‘clerical’ Enlightenment. 
 
Keywords: Christian political economy; commercial sociability; neo-Stoicism; 
oikeiosis; self-love; state of nature 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Intellectual histories of economic thought remain incomplete without acknowledging 
the pioneering work of Istvan Hont. His famous essay ‘The Language of Sociability 
and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four-
Stages” Theory’, first published in 1990, remains a cornerstone of the field of study.1 
The underlying premise of Hont’s work revolved around the intellectual tension 
between Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632-94). Commercial society was ‘invented’, Hont contended, when 
Pufendorf adjoined Hobbes’s intellectual method with Grotius’s modernised form of 
jurisprudence, thereby arriving at an explanatory model detailing the reasons why, 
and how, individuals in a state of nature eventually opted to enter into society. In 
time, Hont continued, Pufendorf’s model was to become the foundational basis for the 
great ‘Four-Stages Theory’ of societal development synonymous with eighteenth-
century Scottish political economists, most notably David Hume (1711-76) and Adam 
Smith (1723-90). As Hont elsewhere put it (in collaboration with Michael Ignatieff), 
the natural jurisprudential tradition was therefore the source of Smith’s central 
preoccupation with the issues of ‘needs’ and ‘justice’ in the seminal Wealth of 
Nations (1776):  
 
Smith was simply transposing into the language of markets an ancient jurisprudential 
discourse, carried into modernity by Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke […] designed to show 
how an economy of abundance could be created in which this ancient jurisprudential 
                                                            
1 Hont, “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical 
Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages’ Theory.” In Pagden, ed., Languages of Political Theory in Early-
Modern Europe, 253-78; republished and expanded in Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 159-84. 
 4 
antinomy between the needs of the poor and the rights of the rich could be transcended 
altogether.2 
 
One of Hont’s most significant assertions regarding Pufendorf was that the 
jurist facilitated subsequent analyses of the historical emergence of commercial 
society purged of its theological connotations. Just as Grotius had inaugurated an 
international legal order liberated from confessional strife, so too, Hont argued, did 
Pufendorf flesh out an essentially secular, transnational commercial order, which 
subsequent political economists utilised in order to counter ‘neo-Machiavellian’ 
reason of state in its latest mercantile guise (encapsulated in the phrase ‘jealousy of 
trade’).3 In doing so, Hont contrasted Pufendorf’s sociable trajectory with a distinctly 
theological account of the genesis of commercial sociability which emerged in 
parallel in the late seventeenth-century. This was the Epicurean-Augustinianism of 
French Jansenists such as Pierre Nicole (1625-95) and Blaise Pascal (1623-62), who 
claimed that God’s redemptive plan for Fallen humanity revealed itself in the 
unintended socioeconomic utility engendered by individual selfishness and cupidity.4 
In recent decades, it has become something of a commonplace to couple this 
Epicurean-Augustinian tradition with conventional, self-interest-based accounts of the 
genesis of modern economic thought.5 In large part, this is because of its perceived 
and actual compatibility with, among others, the ‘Passions and Interests’ model 
                                                            
2 Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and justice in the Wealth of Nations,” 2. 
3  Hont, “Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political 
Economy Reconsidered.”  
4 Hont, “Jealousy of Trade,” 47-51. For surveys of Epicurean-Augustinian versus Stoic themes in this 
period see Osler, Atoms, Pneuma, and Traquillity; LaFond, L’Homme et son Image: Morales et 
littératures de Montaigne à Mandeville, esp. “Augustinisme et Épicurisme,” 353-4; Force, Self-Interest 
Before Smith. Recognition of Hont’s later increased engagement with such themes, e.g., Hont, Politics 
in Commercial Society, 15-6, 19, is warranted. 
5 Viner, “‘Possessive Individualism’ as Original Sin”; Sahlins et al., “The Sweetness of Sadness”; 
Faccarello, The Foundations of Laissez-faire; Waterman, Political Economy and Christian Theology; 
Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment. 
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popularised by Albert O. Hirschman in the 1970s and the theory of spontaneous order 
which now pervades the contemporary social sciences. 6 In many respects, Hont’s 
thesis did not deviate much from this approach. Consigning the theological 
rationalisation for the emergence of commercial sociability to the Augustinian-
Epicureanism of Nicole et al., conversely, Hont’s reading of Grotius and Pufendorf 
was essentially secular in tone. Yet was Hont’s evaluation correct on this head? 
This paper argues that there is strong reason to challenge this aspect of Hont’s 
thesis. In the first instance, any consideration of Grotius’s foundational influence 
demands acknowledgement of the jurist’s well-known theoretical inconsistency, the 
result of which is that he has become ‘posthumously all things to all men’.7 In turn, 
this variability has led to persistent, conflicting accounts about the nature of Grotius’s 
legacy, invariably revolving around whether or not he was an Epicurean or Stoic 
thinker, secular or Christian in his approach, or a Scholastic-Aristotelian as opposed 
to a ‘modern’ natural law theorist. This said, the foundational premise of this paper is 
far from novel. In unison with many scholars, it contends that Grotius’s theological 
and philosophical ambiguity originates, in large part, in the discrepancy between the 
self-interested and sociable aspects of his thought. Where it does differ significantly 
from extant analyses, however, is in its identification of both the initial locus and 
subsequent trajectory of this famous Grotian dichotomy. Specifically, this paper 
contends that the ‘self-interest versus sociability’ conundrum, which served as the 
blueprint for the eighteenth-century science of man, homo economicus and homo 
socius, was an unintended consequence of Grotius’s utilisation of Stoic oikeiosis in 
The Rights of War and Peace (1625). Furthermore, the article claims that Pufendorf’s 
                                                            
6  Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, esp. 9-12, 15, 20, 44; Hayek, “Competition as a 
Discovery Procedure”; Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order. 
7 Wight, “Grotius: 10 April 1583-28 August 1645,” 32. 
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theoretical perpetuation of the oikeiosis process, via a crucial detour through 
Hobbes’s state of nature, leads us to a markedly different conclusion to that which 
Hont proposed. 
Why is this significant? Oikeiosis is a traditional Stoic term signifying, at its 
most rudimentary, the ethical disparity between one’s sense of ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
Additionally, oikeiosis shares its etymological root with the term oikonomia, which is 
today rendered in English as ‘economics’. Consequently, a growing number of studies 
acknowledge oikeiosis as a foundational principle in the history of Western political 
and economic thought. In recent times, for example, oikeiosis has become 
increasingly associated with early modern debates about cosmopolitanism, patriotism 
and the foundations of international ethics and international law, particularly in an 
eighteenth-century British context.8 From the perspective of this paper, however, what 
is most significant is the direct application of oikeiosis to Smith’s economic thought. 
According to Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Smith ‘embraced oikeiosis as an empirical 
fact’, yet rejected its cosmopolitan and teleological conclusions.9 Accordingly, she 
argues that Smith’s qualified adoption of oikeiosis is revelatory in the context of the 
classic Das Adam Smith Problem: that is, the perceived disparity between the 
ostensibly mechanistic and ‘self-interested’ economics of The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) and the ‘sociable’ meta-ethics of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1758).10 
‘Are the books consistent or continuous?’, Forman-Barzilai summarises. ‘And if not, 
which in Smith’s mind was prior? Was Smith primarily an ethical or an economic 
                                                            
8 Duthille, “Richard Price on patriotism and universal benevolence,” esp. 30-2; McDaniel, “Unsocial 
Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment,” 664-5; Richards, Economics, Ethics, and Ancient Thought, 
50-1, 61, 84-5, 124-5, 164-5, 181. 
9 Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, 8. 
10  Oncken, “The Consistency of Adam Smith”; Smith and Dixon, “Das Adam Smith Problem: A 
Critical Realist Perspective”; Göçmen, The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and 
Society; Force, Self- Interest Before Adam Smith, 256-63.  
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thinker? Were human beings driven primarily by sympathy or self-interest, virtue or 
vice? Homo socius or homo oeconomicus?’11 
 
Though I believe the tension is putatively artificial … I revisit the problem … to challenge 
economic interpretations of the Smithian self as driven primarily by egoism and utility 
considerations, and the tendency among non-specialists and in public discourse generally 
to reduce the Smithian self to “economic man.” I argue that the self was complex for 
Smith, and often quite conflicted, struggling to negotiate tensions between its selfish and 
other-regarding tendencies.12 
 
To an extent, the present author agrees with Forman-Barzilai that the Stoic 
theory of oikeiosis shaped, in certain of its aspects, eighteenth-century debates about 
the historical advent of commercial society. Additionally, the present paper concurs 
with her analysis that a neo-Stoic reading of Smith yields a plausible (though hardly 
unequivocal) interpretation of the Scot’s political economy as a significant 
manifestation of the oikeiosis principle.13 Be that as it may, this work asserts that far 
more can and ought to be done to chart—in precise terms—the emergence and 
propagation of Stoic oikeiosis in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century economic 
discourse. This endeavour is important, because it sheds new light on well-worn, 
though as yet underdeveloped, inquiries into the moral-philosophical and theological 
foundations of eighteenth-century British political economy. Specifically, the paper 
claims that a neo-Stoic, or Christian Stoic, reading of the seventeenth-century jurists 
offers a theoretical counterpoise to the dominant neo-Epicurean-Augustinianism 
                                                            
11 Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, 30. 
12 Ibid., 12. 
13 For further acknowledgement of Stoic oikeiosis in Smith’s economic and moral thought, see Brown, 
Adam Smith’s Discourse. 
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within which much of the era’s political economy is currently framed.14 Extrapolating 
one step further from these points, these pages contend that an examination of the 
Grotian-Pufendorfian and neo-Stoic-oikeioisis trajectory does not necessarily lead 
inexorably to the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, as is commonly 
supposed. Rather, they suggest that a reappraisal of these subjects steers us towards 
the very heart of the early English Enlightenment, vis-à-vis the Anglican 
establishment duo Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1751) and Dean Josiah Tucker (1713-
99). 
As conventional analyses have it, of which Hont’s is perhaps the most 
exhaustive, two of the most important intellectual conduits for the transposition of 
Grotius and Pufendorf’s ideas to the eighteenth-century Scottish universities and 
beyond were, among others, 15  Gershom Carmicheal (c. 1672-1729) and Francis 
Hutcheson (1694-1746); both of whom were predecessors of Smith on the Chair of 
Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Small wonder, then, that the 
seventeenth-century jurists are so often cited as the intellectual progenitors of 
eighteenth-century Scottish jurisprudence, natural law and, in the second half of the 
century, political economy.16 There is, however, a significant fly in the ointment 
regarding this analysis. As these pages will demonstrate, Butler and Tucker’s brand of 
English Christian political economy owed a substantial debt to the continental 
Protestant natural law tradition – a fact which extant analyses scarcely acknowledge, 
                                                            
14 Cf. notes 4-5 above. The most important resource for the neo-Stoic interpretation of Grotius and 
Pufendorf is the collection of essays published in Blom and Winkel, eds., Grotius and the Stoa.  
15 Haakonssen, “Natural jurisprudence and the identity of the Scottish Enlightenment,” esp. 261-71. 
16  Forbes, “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment”; Moore and Silverthorne, “Gershom 
Carmichael and the natural jurisprudence tradition in Scotland”; Moore, “Natural Rights in the Scottish 
Enlightenment”; Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment, 142-44.  
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let alone account for.17 The reason for this lack of attention is hardly mystifying. It 
has long been established that Georgian clerics, most of whom were educated in the 
ancient English universities, were by and large left unexposed to influences from the 
Continental mainland. This is in stark contrast to the moderate Calvinism which 
became entrenched in Scotland and isolated, provincial – that is to say, dissenting – 
pockets of England. As Terence H. Irwin elaborates:  
 
Both Scottish Presbyterians and English and Welsh Dissenters seem to have been exposed 
to Continental influences that did not affect English Anglican writers to the same degree. 
The study of Grotius and Pufendorf was entrenched both in Glasgow and in Philip 
Doddridge’s [1702-51] Dissenting academy, but English Anglican writers do not refer to 
them as often.18  
 
Crucially, however, Butler was a Presbyterian by birth and, famously, a later 
Anglican convert, meaning that he both conformed with, and diverged from, this 
configuration. This said, the final introductory premise of this paper is that the neo-
Stoic variant of the natural law tradition was became deeply embedded in the Oxford-
educated Tucker’s political economy via Butler, whom Tucker served as private 
chaplain from 1739 until Butler’s death in 1752.  
The links between Butler and Tucker have been noted transiently in extant 
histories of economic thought.19 However, it is only recently that the full implications 
of their intellectual and theo-philosophical partnership have begun to receive 
                                                            
17 A notable exception is Dickey, “Doux-commerce and humanitarian values.” However, Dickey does 
not sketch the full extent of the relationship between Grotius, Pufendorf and Tucker, and, crucially, 
makes no mention of Butler. 
18 Irwin, The Development of Ethics … II, 205. 
19 Clark, Josiah Tucker Economist, 25; Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, 7-9; Shelton, Dean Tucker, 14-16.  
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sustained treatment. 20  Typically, Butler and Tucker’s contributions to eighteenth-
century economic discourse have been analysed via means of their putative 
‘emergence’ from the Newtonian natural theology tradition – a perception that is 
reinforced by Butler’s well-known correspondence with the Boyle Lecturer Samuel 
Clarke (1675-1729), which precipitated the former’s conversion to the Anglican 
ministry in the mid-1710s.21 This paper does not seek to disavow this exposition. The 
Newtonian natural theology tradition was indeed pervasive among the British 
intellectual classes during the eighteenth-century, especially among Georgian 
prelates, and Butler and Tucker were no exception to this. 22  At the same time, 
however, these pages suggest that Butler and Tucker’s Newtonianism operated in 
tandem with what Marco Barducci has recently called the ‘[n]eo-Platonism, neo-
Stoicism, and Erasmian humanism [which] were … some of the main sources of 
Grotius’ ethics, epistemology, and theology, and [which] converged [at about the turn 
of the eighteenth-century] on the backdrop of the latitudinarian movement and of 
“England’s moderate mainstream Enlightenment”’. 23  This said, our task in what 
follows is to adumbrate at least one significant ramification of this complex 
intermingling of narratives and traditions: namely that of the emergence of Butler and 
                                                            
20 Price, “Liberty, Poverty and Charity.” 
21 Waterman, Political Economy and Christian Theology, 109-13, esp. 112. For the “simultaneous 
kinship and distance” between the English and Scottish varieties of Enlightenment in the context of the 
era’s Christian political economy, see also Young, “Christianity, Commerce and the Canon”, quotation 
at 395. 
22 For Newton’s influence on the English “clerical” Enlightenment, see, e.g., Cassirer, The Philosophy 
of the Enlightenment; Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution; Jacob, Robert Boyle and the 
English Revolution; Jacob and Jacob, “The Anglican Origins of Modern Science”; Gascoigne, 
Cambridge in the Age of Enlightenment; Young, Religion and Enlightenment, 83-119. For Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations interpreted as a work of Newtonian natural theology, see Waterman, Political 
Economy and Christian Theology, 88-126. 
23 Barducci, Hugo Grotius and the Century of Revolution, 135-6. The phrase “England’s moderate 
mainstream Enlightenment” belongs to Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 345. For earlier suggestions of 
a putatively “optimistic,” “Grotian,” “Arminian” or “Erasmian” Enlightenment see Trevor-Roper, The 
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, esp. Chap. 4: ‘The Religious Origins of the Enlightenment’; Pocock, 
“Clergy and commerce”; Pocock, “Conservative Enlightenment and democratic revolutions”; Pocock, 
Barbarism and Religion Volume One, esp. Chap. 2: “Lausanne and the Arminian Enlightenment.” 
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Tucker’s socioeconomic thought. 
The present author is well aware that there is a great deal of scepticism 
regarding the plausibility of an association between early modern neo-Stoicism and 
eighteenth-century political economy, still more that it might be applied to Butler and 
Tucker’s ideas to any meaningful extent. Accordingly, this paper is intended as a 
response of sorts to these misgivings.24 To this end, the article proceeds in Section 2 
with discussion of Grotius’s utilisation of Stoic oikeiosis in its ‘personal’ and ‘social’ 
forms, drawing particular attention to his distinction between animal, human and 
divine nature, which is an important leitmotif of the oikeiosis process. Its main 
contention is that the Grotian understanding of oikeiosis is a major signifier of the 
jurist’s ambiguous legacy, whether among his immediate and eighteenth-century 
successors or among present-day historians. Section 3 details Hobbes and Pufendorf’s 
various responses to Grotius, highlighting above all the latter’s co-option of important 
aspects of his two predecessors’ thought. Adapting Hont’s thesis, the section’s central 
argument is that Pufendorf’s ‘pre-commercial’ language of self-love and sociability 
gains far greater clarity when viewed through a neo-Stoic lens. Section 4 changes tack 
by turning to Butler’s iteration of oikeiosis in an eighteenth-century British/Anglican 
context. Specifically, it discusses the Butlerian reformulation of the ‘self-love versus 
sociability’ motif in terms of the disparity between ‘Brute Creation’ and ‘Moral 
Government’. This exposition culminates in Section 5 with Tucker’s Christian Stoic 
response to Bernard Mandeville’s Hobbesian and neo-Epicurean-Augustinian critique 
of commercial modernity, where it posits that Tucker’s economic thought is the 
logical highpoint of the oikeiosis process. The paper closes in Section 6 with a brief 
                                                            
24 For a statement of this scepticism in relation to the present author’s work, notwithstanding some 
profound points of agreement, see Oslington, “Anglican Social Thought and the Shaping of Political 
Economy in Britain,” 40, n. 4. 
 12 
reappraisal of Butler and Tucker’s significance to the eighteenth-century ‘commercial 
sociability’ debate and the Scottish Enlightenment. 
 
2. From ‘Personal’ To ‘Social’ Oikeiosis: Hugo Grotius. 
 
In the famous ‘Prolegomena’ to The Rights of War and Peace (1625), Grotius sets 
down the basis for his system of natural law. ‘Man is indeed an Animal’, he writes, 
but one of a very high Order, and that excells all the other Species of Animals much 
more than they differ from one another; as the many Actions proper only to Mankind 
sufficiently demonstrate’:  
 
Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of Society, that is, a certain 
Inclination to live with those of his own Kind, not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, 
and in a Community regulated according to the best of his Understanding; which 
Disposition the Stoicks termed oikeiosis. Therefore the Saying, that every Creature is led 
by Nature to seek its own private Advantage, expressed thus universally, must not be 
granted.25 
 
Many scholars contend that it is this passage which confirms that Grotius was 
basically a Stoic thinker, setting in train the great seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
debate about man’s suitability for society (appetitus societatis) and the legal and 
juridical parameters around which his rights might be secured. Nevertheless, the theo-
philosophical foundations of Grotius’s thought remain a rather large bone of 
contention among specialists. Richard Tuck, for example, remains consistently 
forthright in his view that the Grotian scheme was anchored by the primacy of self-
                                                            
25 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I, “Prolegomena” or “Preliminary Discourse,” VI, 79-81. 
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interest, since this approach was Grotius’s only credible means of refuting the 
challenge of post-Renaissance scepticism, particularly the contemporary renewal of 
interest in the ancient Academic Sceptic Carneades.26 On the other hand, Tuck’s 
interpretation has also been criticised for leaning too far towards scepticism or 
Epicureanism,27 with some scholars arguing that the jurist’s system sanctioned human 
sociability above all else,28 while others still claim that Grotius was finely poised 
between the two poles.29  
Ironically, it is precisely Grotius’s distinction between human and animal 
nature in the above-cited, alongside his utilisation of oikeiosis, which fuels much of 
the uncertainty as to where he himself stood on the matter. For while oikeiosis is often 
considered to be an unambiguously Stoic term, typically associated with Cicero and 
the third century Stoic Hierocles, a closer reading reveals that the phrase eludes any 
single, precise definition. Derived from the Greek root oikos (meaning the 
management of the private sphere or household), and loosely translated as 
‘approbation’ or ‘familiarisation’, at its most basic oikeiosis connotes the conceptual 
space existing within all rational creatures between their self-interest on the one side 
and their concern for others on the other.30 Hierocles’s famous definition, based on an 
evocative theory of concentric circles, relays the image of rings expanding outwards 
from the immediate proximity of the innermost self, to one’s own family, to one’s 
friends and neighbours, to one’s local community, to one’s nation, and so on, until the 
final ring encompasses humanity as a whole. Based on this description, Julia Annas 
claims that oikeiosis is the most radically teleological component of the Stoic 
                                                            
26 Tuck, “Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes”; Tuck, “The ‘modern’ theory of natural law,” esp. 113; 
Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, 94-102. 
27 Zagorin, “Hobbes without Grotius”; Mautner, “Grotius and the Skeptics.” 
28 Shaver, “Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest”; Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature. 
29 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights. 
30 Brink, “Oikeiosis and oikeiotes: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory”; Pembroke, 
“Oikeiosis”; Engberg-Pederson, The Stoic theory of oikeiosis. 
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philosophy, in that it enjoins all rational beings to view the world (and indeed the 
universe) not from the limited standpoint of self-centeredness, but rather from the 
perspective of one’s relation to a greater whole.31 Insofar as this model has been 
applied to early modern political thought, scholars have ascribed the concept with 
various labels such as ‘Stoic universalism’, ‘Stoic naturalism’, ‘cosmopolitan 
providence’, the ‘providential design model’ or ‘providential naturalism’.32 However, 
the key point we are attempting to get across at this stage is that, during the early 
modern period, oikeiosis was generally invoked as a rhetorical adjunct for Stoic 
sociability and the sympathetic, benevolent affections. Furthermore, these categories 
were deemed to be the preserve both of cosmic and human nature, since, according to 
the ancient Stoics, they were essentially interchangeable. 
In Christopher Brooke’s lucid treatment of the revival of early modern 
Stoicism, he contends that Annas’s definition of oikeiosis is particularly applicable to 
Grotius.33 This is because he sees a strong affinity between Annas’s deployment of 
the term and Cicero’s in Di finibus, which Grotius frequently appeals to in Rights of 
War and Peace. Specifically, Brooke approves of Annas’s distinction between 
‘personal’ oikeiosis (linked to Cicero’s account in Di finibus III. 16-21) and ‘social’ 
oikeiosis (III. 62-71), which Jon Miller elsewhere describes as two ‘aspects of one 
fundamental impulse’.34 And yet, herein lies the rub. For while ‘social’ oikeiosis is 
evidently intended to be an outward-facing proposition, underscoring the individual’s 
care and concern for the collective common good, the opposite and opposing force 
within human nature is, of course, said to be ‘personal’ oikeiosis, which maintains 
                                                            
31 Annas, The Morality of Happiness, Chap. 5, “The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of 
the Universe,” 159-179. 
32  E.g., Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 24-6, 50-1, 61, 90-4; Irwin, “Stoic 
Naturalism and its Critics”; Long, “Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler”; 
Dickey, “Doux-commerce and humanitarian values,” 310, n. 202. 
33 Brooke, Philosophic Pride, Chap. 2. “Grotius, Stoicism and Oikeiosis,” 37-55. 
34 Miller, “Stoics, Grotius, and Spinoza on Moral Deliberation,” 137, n. 28. 
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that individual persons seek, reflexively, to place their self-preservation above all 
else. To a profound extent, then, this dichotomy is the wellspring of the ambiguity 
regarding Grotius’s true allegiance on this head. Did the natural jurist position self-
preservation at the forefront of his system? Or was it rather man’s impulse for society, 
the appetitus societatis, which was of greater import within the Grotian scheme?  
Benjamin Straumann, who identifies the origins of Grotius’s thought in the 
Roman law tradition, generally agrees with Brooke that Grotius’s version of oikeiosis 
was essentially Ciceronian, and therefore anti-Epicurean, in origin. Straumann 
proposes further, however, that Grotius’s reformulation of the concept was distinctly 
anthropological in tone: that is to say that Grotius stressed the primacy of ‘social’ 
over ‘personal’ oikeiosis so as to ‘refute the Carneadean claim that all animals strive 
only for their own advantage’.35 Put otherwise, while Grotius accepted the permanent 
presence of the individual’s drive towards their own advantage (utilitatum suarum 
stadium), by the same token, he did not preclude the existence of their opposing drive 
toward society. Explaining why the latter instinct was far more pronounced in humans 
than animals was, therefore, a central concern within the Grotian scheme: 
 
But it must be owned that a Man grown up, being capable of acting in the same Manner 
with respect to Things that are alike, has, besides an exquisite Desire of Society, for the 
Satisfaction of which he alone of all Animals has received from Nature a peculiar 
Instrument, viz. the Use of Speech; I say, that he has, besides that, a Faculty of knowing 
and acting, according to some general Principles; so that what relates to this Faculty is 
not common to all Animals, but properly and peculiarly agrees to Mankind.36 
 
                                                            
35 Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature, 91. 
36 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I, “Prolegomena,” XII., 82-85. 
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For Grotius, then, following the Stoics and Aristotle, it was man’s capacity for 
reason and rationality (recta ratio), and especially his use of speech (logos), which 
inclined him towards society. For while animals and human infants evidently 
displayed an instinctive aptitude for ‘personal’ oikeiosis, it was only in the fully 
grown, mature adult that ‘social’ oikeiosis—defined as rationality’s telos—could be 
said to preside over one’s outward actions. In classical discourse, this notion was 
exemplified by the wise Stoic sage who had achieved true wisdom via slow and 
deliberative reflection. Analogically, it was by these means that the individual became 
increasingly cognisant of, and sympathetic to, the manifold concerns of others. 
Extrapolating from this, Grotius recognised as axiomatic the bifurcated character of 
rational human life. For, on the one side, he observed, individuals were clearly 
comprised of natural drives and instincts (prima naturae/self-preservation); yet on the 
other, humans also consisted of right reason and sound judgement (honestum/society). 
According to Grotius, natural justice (ius naturalle) was therefore any action that did 
not injure another person’s suum cuique (‘mine and thine’, or ‘may all get their 
due’).37 Furthermore, whether one spoke of the natural law in terms of iura (‘perfect 
rights’; the minimal moral foundation necessary for social life), 38  or aptitudines 
(‘imperfect rights’; any level of morality unrelated to the necessaries of life), 39 
Grotius asserted that justice (ius), in its three significations, was an inherent moral 
characteristic in all humans irrespective of creed or race: 
 
                                                            
37 Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), XV. “… lustitia suum cuique distribuit” 
(“… justice, the virtue which assigns to each his due”). 
38 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I. I. VIII, 142: “‘Tis expletive Justice, Justice properly and strictly 
taken, which respects the Faculty, or perfect Right …” 
39 Ibid., I. I. IV, 138: “[A] moral Quality when perfect, is called by us a Faculty; when imperfect, an 
Aptitude: The former answers to the Act, and the latter to the Power, when we speak of natural 
Things.” 
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[First] Right signifies merely that which is just, and that too rather in a negative than a 
positive Sense. So that the Right of War is properly that which may be done without 
Injustice with regard to an Enemy. Now that is unjust which is repugnant to the Nature of 
a Society of reasonable Creatures …40 
 [Second] … another Signification of the Word Right different from this, but yet 
arising from it, … relates directly to the Person: In which Sense Right is a moral Quality 
[qualitas moralis] annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly 
…41 
 There is also a third Sense of the Word Right, according to which it signifies the 
same Thing as Law [lex], when taken in its largest Extent, as being a Rule of Moral 
Actions, obliging us to that which is good and commendable.42 
 
As Knud Haakonssen summarises, the underlying principle of Grotius’s conception of 
justice is therefore the cultivation of social relations; for without this there can be no 
prospect of living in peaceable society, nor of interacting with one’s fellow kind. 
Moreover, maintaining sociability requires that humans balance their ‘pure self-
interest and social inclinations by entering into contractual relationships’, leading, in 
turn, to the development of Law (lex) in the guise of property relations, modes of 
living, structures of authority, the punishment of transgressions and so on.43  
Much more could of course be said about these and many other aspects of 
Grotius’s thought. In the context of this paper, however, the key point we are 
attempting to get across is Grotius’s identification of rights and obligations (which are 
essentially his conception of the foundation of natural law) with anthropological 
human nature, associated in turn with Stoic oikeiosis. That is to say that, while 
                                                            
40 Ibid., I. I. III, 136. 
41 Ibid., I. I. IV, 138. 
42 Ibid., I. I. IX, 147-8. 
43 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 26-30. 
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Grotius accepted the basic tenets of Christianity, arguing that natural justice (ius 
naturelle) was prescribed by God, he maintained further that humans unaided by 
religion were capable of reaching some form of consensus (concordia) regarding the 
contractual, and quasi-contractual, obligations upon which social life rested. In so 
doing, it is often remarked that Grotius’s main ‘achievement’ was, of course, that he 
separated theology from natural law, thereby facilitating on rational grounds the 
modern international legal order: that is, an order liberated from moral relativism and 
the threat of confessional strife.44  Yet what is perhaps most intriguing from our 
present standpoint is the way in which, via the psychological mechanisms of 
‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis, the hierarchy between animal, human and divine 
nature effectively collapses, meaning that the Grotian appetitus societatis is 
essentially perceived in universalist terms. (This is not to suggest that Grotius 
demoted God’s status but rather that he elevated rational human nature).45 It is in this 
respect that Grotius may be labelled a neo-Stoic thinker; and, moreover, in a Lipsian 
vein, as Christopher A. Ford has argued quite persuasively. 46  Yet despite this, 
Grotius’s ambivalence is of course never far away. As Hans. W. Blom observes, 
throughout his writing Grotius is consistently ‘evasive and eclectic at the same time, 
making his arguments acceptable to different ideological communities, precisely by 
                                                            
44 For a study of Grotius’s achievement described in terms of the creation of a universal morality as a 
“distinctive normative force,” see Darwall, Honor, History, & Relationship, Chap 8: “Grotius at the 
Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy,” 157-88. 
45 For the “partial levelling of distinction between human and animal,” see Straumann, Roman Law in 
the State of Nature, 92-3. Contrast, however, with Renée Jeffery, Hugo Grotius in International 
Thought, 31: “However, what is of central importance in [Grotius’s] somewhat pedantic taxonomy is 
the idea that although humans are capable of making laws, those that are not in accordance with the 
law of nature and, by extension, divine law, are not considered law at all. What this implies is that the 
structure of Grotius’ legal and moral order was hierarchical: that is, natural law is of a higher status 
than human volitional law and both are superseded by divine volitional law.” 
46 Ford, “Preaching Propriety to Princes.” For an arguably more measured interpretation see Waszink, 
“Lipsius and Grotius: Tacitism.”  
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avoiding taking sides’.47 It is the consequences of this aspect of Grotius’s thought for 
his intellectual followers that we are addressing in these pages. 
 
3. The Language of Self-Love and Sociability in ‘Pre-Commercial’ Society: 
Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf. 
 
As we shall shortly see, it was left above all to Pufendorf to refine Grotius’s 
distinction between human and animal nature, and to better define the relationship 
between natural law and divine volitional law. Before doing so, however, we must 
first turn briefly to Hobbes, since it was he that Pufendorf was forced to circumvent in 
order to reach his very different, yet complementary, conclusions. While Hobbes 
agreed with Grotius that humans were given the world to use, he fundamentally 
disagreed that sociability was the overriding constituent of human nature. On the 
contrary, in Leviathan (1649) Hobbes infamously declared that equality among 
individuals in the state of nature led to the condition of anarchy, which he based on 
‘three principle causes of quarrel’: firstly ‘competition’, which ‘maketh men invade 
for gain’; secondly ‘diffidence’, which individuals offered up for their minimal level 
of ‘safety’; and lastly ‘glory’, which is man’s desire (more pronounced in some 
individuals) for ‘reputation’. ‘Hereby it is manifest’, Hobbes thereby concluded, ‘that 
during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are 
in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against 
every man’.48  
                                                            
47 Blom, “Sociability and Hugo Grotius,” 603. For Blom, only Grotius’s conception of justice remains 
consistent throughout his oeuvre. 
48 Hobbes, Leviathan, I. XIII: “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity, and 
Misery,” 141-45. 
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From this fundamental premise, there followed an unavoidably pessimistic 
social psychology accentuating humanity’s mutual untrustworthiness, and placing 
moral relativism and scepticism at its very core. Notwithstanding this major 
propositional disparity, Hobbes did, however, agree with Grotius that language was 
the bedrock of man’s rational faculties. This propensity accounted, for example, for 
the development of the arts and sciences and indeed all human civilisation. Yet by the 
same token, Hobbes declared that language was simultaneously the fount of lies, 
deceits and falsehoods, which ambitious men deployed in their pursuit of prestige and 
gain. Viewed from this perspective, human morals, far from being a series of a priori 
prescriptions (whether divine or otherwise), were, in truth, ‘self-imposed’ or 
‘artificial’ constructs. Consequently, for Hobbes, morals did not necessarily conform 
to human nature tout court, for they were merely the prudential means of protecting 
oneself against innumerable random acts performed by others which might interfere 
with, or threaten, one’s own survival.49 Accordingly, ‘Just Naturale [natural justice]’, 
Hobbes concluded,  
 
is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation 
of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, 
which in his own judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto.50  
 
As is well known, Hobbes’s answer to this moral and intellectual impasse was 
distinctly political. Only by relinquishing a sizeable portion of one’s individual 
liberty, and placing it in the hands of the sovereign, could self-preservation among 
                                                            
49 Recognition of Hobbes’s adoption of Epicurean atomism is appropriate here. 
50 Hobbes, Leviathan, I. XIV: “Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts,” 145-6. 
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individuals be (said to be) mutually assured. In consequence, Hobbes asserted that the 
notion of moral authority was inter-subjectively the sovereign’s law, and this he 
labelled both the natural law and the social contract, so ‘that men perform their 
covenants made’:51 
 
The only way to erect … a common power, as may be able to defend [peoples] from the 
invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another … is, to confer all their power and 
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by 
plurality of voices, unto one will … This done, the multitude so united in one person, is 
called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS … the great LEVIATHAN … 
And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and is said to have sovereign 
power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.52  
 
Unsurprisingly, the scandalous nature of Hobbes’s position prompted most of 
his contemporaries and successors to label him an Epicurean-materialist; a moral 
relativist and sceptic far worse than any Renaissance humanist had been.53 For if, as 
Hobbes appeared to be claiming, human nature was merely the sum-total of its animal 
passions and instincts, and if by extension the sovereign’s law was but a mere mirror 
and reflection of these ‘base’ principles, in what sense could a plausible distinction be 
made between the state of nature and civil society? Worse still, if humans were not 
sociable agents à la Aristotle, the Stoics and Grotius, how could society’s moral and 
legal norms be conceived as the product of divine and/or rational endowment?54 Were 
                                                            
51 Ibid., I. XV: “Of Other Laws of Nature,” 156. 
52 Ibid., I. XVII: “Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth,” 176-7. 
53 Although note Brooke’s observation (Philosophic Pride, Chap. 5) that Hobbes was considered an 
unusual type of Stoic among some contemporaries. 
54  For Hobbes’s denial of the Aristotelian zōon politikon, since “agreement” between animals is 
“natural,” whereas between humans it is “by covenant only, which is artificial,” see Leviathan, I. XVII, 
175-6. 
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social relations even possible within the Hobbesian scheme? Correspondingly, was 
the Grotian appetitus societatis little more than a vain fancy? These were some of the 
pressing issues Pufendorf faced.  
Traditionally, Pufendorf’s ideas have been scrutinised through his adoption of 
the post-Baconian deductive sciences and Cartesian dualism, both of which facilitated 
the jurist’s central distinction between the physical world (entia physica), 
discoverable a posteriori, and the moral world (entia moralia), which Pufendorf 
believed was self-existent a priori. In either case, Pufendorf insisted that the physical 
and moral worlds were created by God. Crucially, however, it was only the latter 
which he equated with basic human nature, and this meant, as Grotius had showed, 
that the principle of self-preservation was an inherently moral faculty, contra Hobbes. 
Crucially, then, while Pufendorf clearly admired the author of the Leviathan, has 
Haakonssen has shown, his Lutheran pietism obliged him to reject the most 
incendiary aspects of the Hobbesian scheme, most notably its radically reductionist 
interpretation of self-preservation and its moral relativism.55 Additionally, although 
Pufendorf ultimately sided with Grotius regarding the sociable content, though not 
necessarily the sociable foundation, of the natural law, he remained dissatisfied with 
the Dutch jurist’s allegedly ‘unsystematic’ method (i.e., its perceived affinities with 
pre-Renaissance scholasticism), alongside Grotius’s seeming overreliance on 
mankind’s rational faculties at the expense of the higher authority of God.56  
To better understand how Pufendorf reconciled the disparities between Grotius 
and Hobbes, it may be beneficial to turn at this stage to the neo-Stoic interpretation of 
the jurist which has gained greater currency in recent years. Promulgated by the likes 
                                                            
55  Haakonssen presents a useful preamble to Pufendorf’s ideas in the context of the German 
Lutheranism debate in his Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 35-7. 
56 Grunert, “The Reception of Hugo Grotius’s De Jure Belli Ac Pacis,” esp. 94-5. 
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of Horst Denzer, Tim Hochstrasser, Fiammetta Palladini and Kari Saastamoinen 
among others, these scholars have drawn important attention to the Stoic inflections in 
Pufendorf’s major works Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672) and The Whole 
Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature (1673). 57  Denzer observed, for 
example, that there at least 310 references to Stoic authors in the latter treatise, which 
Hochstrasser sees as clear evidence of Pufendorf’s ‘eclectic method’ in ‘combining 
conceptual analysis of a modern author (Grotius), and of ancient Stoic insights, to 
rebut central contentions from [Hobbes]’.58 Be that as it may, it is vitally important to 
note that Pufendorf’s subversion of Hobbes’s scheme ultimately relied, paradoxically, 
on his adoption of Hobbes’s sovereign, which Pufendorf ultimately conceived as 
God.59 Because of this, the present author contends that the German jurist’s brand of 
Christian Stoicism was arguably even more Christian in its orientation than was 
Grotius’s. In the remainder of this section our task, then, is to unpack what this 
analysis entails in the context of Pufendorf’s theoretical anticipation of eighteenth-
century notions of commercial sociability, à la Hont. 
Like Grotius, Pufendorf’s Stoic affinities were palpable, though necessarily far 
more cautious. Confronted, unlike Grotius, with Hobbes’s potent brand of materialism 
and scepticism, he was forced to concede that the wellspring of the natural law was 
indeed individual self-preservation. Crucially, however, in Pufendorf’s mind, this 
admission did not necessarily imply that self-love was directly oppositional to 
                                                            
57 Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment, Chap. 2: “Socialitas and the history 
of natural law: Pufendorf’s defence of De Jure Naturae et Gentium”, 40-71; Palladini, “Pufendorf and 
Stoicism”; Saastamoinen, “Pufendorf and the Stoic model of natural law.”  
58 Denzer, Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf, 260, broken down as follows: 
“Cicero: 155 references; Seneca: 109 references; Marcus Aurelius: 12 references; Epictetus: 34 
references (including those derived through Arrian).” Cf. Hochstrasser, “Socialitas and the history of 
natural law,” 62, n. 72; Riley, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume 10, 
65-9. 
59 For Pufendorf’s reinstallment of the authority of divine volitional law, see Darwall, Honor, History, 
& Relationship, Chap 9: “Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers,” 189-246. 
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Grotius’s broadly neo-Stoic thesis. Indeed, as he made abundantly clear in Of the Law 
of Nature and Nations: ‘Self-love and Sociableness ought by no Means to be made 
Opposites’.60 This said, it was in re-examining the variances between human and 
animal nature that Pufendorf made his decisive pivot back to Grotius’s foundational 
oikeiosis argument: 
 
Man is an Animal extremely desirous of his own Preservation, of himself expos’d to many 
Wants, unable to secure his own Safety and Maintenance, without the Assistance of his 
Fellows and capable of returning the Kindness by the Furtherance of mutual Good . . . 
Now that such a Creature [as Man] may be preserv’d and supported . . . it is necessary that 
he be social . . . This then will appear a fundamental Law of Nature, Every Man ought, as 
far as in him lies, to promote and preserve a peaceful Sociableness with others, agreeable 
to the main End and Disposition of the human Race in general.61 
 
The novelty of Pufendorf’s system, then, was that it achieved a shrewd 
synthesis of the Grotian oikeiosis principle and Hobbes’s state of nature. Adjoining 
Grotius’s modernised form of jurisprudence with Hobbes’s intellectual method, 
Pufendorf argued that it is precisely because individuals in a state of nature are so 
incredibly weak (imbecillitas), both in the moral and physical world, that they feel 
compelled to seek their own safety (salvum) within society. This recourse to mutual 
co-operation, by which means it is possible for human beings to survive and prosper 
even though they are most capable of inflicting damage upon themselves and their 
fellow kind,62 Pufendorf labelled socialitas (‘sociality’). Furthermore, for Pufendorf, 
this was the foundational (i.e., God-willed) principle of the natural law, which every 
                                                            
60 Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and of Nations, II. III. XVI, 139. 
61 Ibid. II. III. XV, 136-7. 
62 Ibid. II. I. VI, 100: “… Man, of all Living Things, is the most able to hurt Man, and, if left to his own 
furious Passions, the most willing.” 
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human is obliged to cultivate and preserve in the interests of the collective – though in 
the first instance, and crucially, by preserving oneself.63 As Saastamoinen has thus put 
it:  
 
In Pufendorf’s theory, the ultimate epistemological foundation of natural law, the one that 
gives us its end, is not human nature, but the idea that God wants the human species to 
survive … That God wants the safety of the whole human species … is the normative 
principle which Hobbes’ [and indeed Grotius’s] theory lacked, and which explains why we 
have an obligation to act peacefully even towards those who are able to hurt us.64 
 
As noted at the outset of this essay, according to Hont, Pufendorf’s intellectual 
oscillation between Grotius and Hobbes constituted a watershed moment in the 
developmental history of the modern state. This is because, in Hont’s view, 
Pufendorf’s ‘Grotian’ ‘amendment’ to Hobbes’s state of nature resulted in the 
‘invention’ of society in its recognisably ‘modern’ guise: namely ‘commercial 
society’.65 Whereas Hobbes’s doctrine was unambiguously political in character, and 
it therefore had little to say about trade and commerce, 66  Hont contended that 
Pufendorf’s ‘partial reversal’67 of his predecessor’s conclusions facilitated the great 
eighteenth-century debate about the historical rise and progress of civil society and 
the economic dimensions increasingly associated with it. Although Pufendorf was 
unable to conceptualise what this scheme entailed in precise terms, for Hont, it was 
                                                            
63  Ibid., II. IV. XVI, 177: “… Society, for which a Man is sent into the World, cannot be well 
exercise’d and maintain’d, unless every one, as much as in him lies, takes care of his own Preservation 
… it manifestly appears, that a Man by throwing aside all Care of his own Life … is highly injurious 
both to Almighty GOD, and to the general Body of Mankind.” 
64 Saastamoinen, “Pufendorf and the Stoic model of natural law,” 267.  
65 Cf. Kingsbury and Straumann, “The State of Nature and Commercial Sociability in International 
Legal Thought,” esp. 35-7. 
66 Hont, “Jealousy of Trade,” 18-22. 
67 Ibid., 38. 
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above all the jurist’s ‘reinstatement of utility as a force for social integration’—
namely, Pufendorf’s theory about human weakness (imbecillitas) and neediness 
(indigentia) precipitating human industry (cultura)—which led humans away from 
the state of nature towards peaceful forms of social consensus and commerce.68  
Yet, given all that we have discussed in the intervening pages, is it possible or 
indeed desirable to map the neo-Stoic characterisation of Grotius and Pufendorf onto 
Hont’s thesis? 69  After all, one fundamental aspect of Hont’s narrative which is 
directly pertinent to the present discussion is his exposition of the jurists’ assessment 
of the disparity between human and animal nature (which we have endeavoured to 
elucidate in terms of Stoic oikeiosis, whereas evidently Hont does not). Specifically, 
Hont draws attention to Pufendorf’s central contention that the relationship between 
humans and animals is one of paradoxical inferiority and superiority. 70  Whereas 
animals are superiorly equipped, argues Pufendorf, via their carnal appetites and 
instincts, to ensure their own survival, conversely man’s ‘exceeding Weakness’ 
precipitates his desire to move beyond the immediate vicinity of his own self-
preservation, in an ‘insatiable Desire and Thirst for those Things which are altogether 
superfluous and unnecessary’.71 According to Pufendorf (contra Grotius), then, this 
predilection accounted for man’s natural sociability in a secondary rather than a 
primary sense, in that it ensured the preservation of human society and the species at 
large in processes of time (custodia societatis humanae). Even more significantly, 
Pufendorf’s historicist claim that humanity’s increasing needs and wants precipitated 
material inequality in the ‘Natural State’ also served to confute Hobbes’s opposing 
                                                            
68 Ibid., 46; “The Language of Sociability and Commerce,” 172. 
69 Hont’s relative disinterest in the role of religion, and especially Christian Stoicism, is noted in 
Haakonssen and Whatmore, “Essay Reviews: Commerce and Enlightenment,” esp. 293. 
70 Hont, “The Language of Sociability and Commerce,” 169-73. 
71 Pufendorf, Whole Duty of Man, II. V. VI, 189. 
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contention that a state of equality (or natural liberty) existed among the earliest 
roaming families. For one thing, Pufendorf’s notion of ‘Paternal Authority’ or 
‘Paternal Power’ over one’s own offspring immediately disavowed Hobbes’s claim.72 
This observation is highly significant since, as Straumann points out, parental 
authority—i.e., the notion that some form of natural hierarchy existed prior to the 
formation of civil society—was second only to self-preservation in the oikeiosis 
process.73  Accordingly, for Pufendorf, it was wrong to assert that natural liberty 
among humans was antecedent to the developmental processes of history, civilisation, 
culture or commerce; rather natural liberty was a by-product of the aforementioned. 
Consequently, unlike Hobbes’s state of nature (and soon to be Locke’s), the 
Pufendorfian analogue was purely fictitious. This is a critically important point which 
we shall be obliged to return to in the context of Tucker below.74  
So far, these pages have claimed that significant aspects of Hont’s thesis are 
compatible with a neo-Stoic reading of Grotius and Pufendorf. Specifically, 
Pufendorf’s imbecillitas—indigentia—cultura scheme mirrors very closely Grotius’s 
implementation of the mechanical processes leading from ‘personal’ to ‘social’ 
oikeiosis, which subsequent theorists and present-day specialists alike appear largely 
to have missed. It is possible, for example, that Hutcheson overlooked this 
fundamentally important aspect of Pufendorf’s thought when he described the 
German’s scheme as an ‘“Epicurean” conjecture’.75 The same might also be said, 
                                                            
72 Ibid., II. I. VII: “Paternal Authority”, 169; II. III. I-VI: “Duty of Parents and Children,” 179-87. Note 
too that for Pufendorf, parental authority is analogous to God’s preeminent authority over humans in 
the state of nature, e.g., Ibid, II. I. VIII, 169: “Now it is the chief Prerogative of those who are in the 
State of Nature, that they are subject and accountable to none but God only; in which respect also, this 
is call’d a State of Natural Liberty, by which is understood, that a Person so circumstanced without 
some antecedent human Act to the contrary, is to be accounted absolutely in his own Power and 
Disposition, and above the Controll of all mortal Authority.” 
73 Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature, 90-5, 99-100. 
74 See esp. notes 136-140. 
75 Quoted in Hont, “Jealousy of Trade,” 39. 
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more recently, of Ian Hunter’s characterisation of Pufendorf’s model as an ‘Epicurean 
anthropology’ premised on the ‘radical separation of moral theology from politics and 
law’.76 In sharp contrast, however, this essay asserts that there is ample evidence to 
suggest that Pufendorf was in fact a Christian Stoic thinker; not least because he 
insisted, far more so than did even Grotius, on the interconnectedness of divine 
authority and natural law, from which his notion of socialitas and the attendant 
offices of life (Officia) ultimately derived. As Haakonssen therefore summarises: 
 
[Pufendorf’s] basic offices of life fall into three categories, that of being a human being 
tout court, that of being a member of a family (as spouse, parent, child, sibling master, 
servant), and that of being a member of a political society (as citizen, sovereign, all 
manner of magistrates, soldier, etc.). These three groups of offices provide the basis for 
Pufendorf’s tripartite division of his material into analyses of the specific natural 
jurisprudential relations of persons as persons, of 'oeconomical' (household) relations in 
the traditional sense, and of civic relations. Self-consciously inspired by Stoicism, this 
theory fitted directly into the Christian Stoicism of the Enlightenment and lived on in the 
popular practical ethics of the eighteenth century as Pufendorf's most pervasive legacy – 
though often on very different philosophical foundations.77  
 
Here Haakonssen is of course referring to Pufendorf’s influence on the 
Scottish Enlightenment and the political economy synonymous with it. In the 
following sections, however, we will seek to divulge the natural jurisprudential and 
Christian Stoic legacy housed within the thought of the Anglican churchmen Butler 
and Tucker. 
 
                                                            
76 Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, xii, 7, 148-96. 
77 Haakonssen, “Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics,” 1138-9. 
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4. The Disparity Between ‘Brute Creatures’ and ‘Moral Government’: Joseph 
Butler. 
 
Recognition of the Stoic tendencies in Butler’s thought has not been uncommon in the 
centuries since the publication of his major works in the first half of the eighteenth-
century. It is only relatively recently, however, that scholars have begun to appreciate 
the full significance of the philosophical tradition to the wider Butlerian scheme. 
Terence Irwin has claimed, for example, that Butler’s ‘moral outlook’ and ‘appeal to 
nature … reasonably invites a comparison with the Stoics’.78 Even more compellingly 
in our context, A. A. Long writes that ‘in order to refute Hobbes and various 
contemporaries’ Butler’s ‘treatment of the two instincts – self-love and conscience – 
is too similar to the Stoic concept oikeiosis to be adventitious’.79 Additionally, both 
scholars draw important attention to Cicero’s influence on Butler, especially the 
Roman orator’s emphasis on the ‘reason of nature, which is divine and human law’, 
and which the later bishop of Bristol and Durham also subscribed to in large part.80 
However, aside from one passing mention of Butler’s probable familiarity with 
Pufendorf’s Law of Nature and of Nations,81 the intellectual connections between 
Butler and the seventeenth-century jurisconsults remains, to the present author’s 
knowledge, chronically underexplored.  
For reasons which remain unclear, unlike Carmichael, Butler nowhere appears 
to have praised Grotius or Pufendorf, and neither did he give them significant pride of 
                                                            
78 Irwin, “Stoic naturalism in Butler,” 274. 
79 Long, “Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler.” In Miller and Inwood, 
eds., Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, 9; republished in Inwood, ed., Cambridge Companion 
to the Stoics, 368-9.  
80 Irwin, The Development of Ethics … II, 486, n. 33; quoting Cicero, De officiis, iii. 23: “And this 
follows even more from the reason of nature, which is divine and human law. If anyone is willing to 
obey it (and all will obey it who want to live in accord with nature), he will never act so as to seek what 
belongs to another and to take for himself what he has taken from another.”  
81 Irwin, “Stoic naturalism and its Critics,” 357, n. 43. 
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place within his scheme.82 We do know, however, that based on the lecture notes of 
Samuel Jones (c. 1681-1719), who was Butler’s tutor at the dissenting academy at 
Tewkesbury between c. 1712-14, Butler was well-versed in their ideas.83 Born in 
Wales and educated at Shrewsbury academy, the Presbyterian Jones had gone on to 
pursue his higher education at the University of Leiden in the United Provinces in 
1706. There, under the tutelage of Jacobus Gronovius (1645-1716), Jacobus 
Perizonius (1651-1715) and Hermanus Witsius (1636-1708),84 he had familiarised 
himself with the Christian Stoic culture previously fostered by, among others, Justus 
Lipsius (who was a foundational Professor of history at Leiden at the tail end of the 
sixteenth century), Grotius (who entered the University at a precociously young age, 
and whose father was a friend of Lipsius himself) and Pufendorf (who spent many 
years at Leiden ruminating on the work of his predecessors following his escape from 
captivity under Charles X of Sweden in the late-1650s).85 Evidently, then, it was the 
Tewkesbury-Leiden connection which proved to be the initial inlet by which Grotius 
and Pufendorf’s ideas came into Butler’s mind.86 
Alongside Jones’s ‘Dutch-style’ teaching, Butler was also an avid reader of 
various contemporary English works, including John Locke’s (1632-1704) Essay 
                                                            
82  For Carmichael’s praise of Grotius and Pufendorf, see Moore and Silverthorne, “Gershom 
Carmichael,” 76-8. 
83 E.g., Samuel Jones, “Notes on Grotius: De jure belli et pacis”; “Nota in Grotium de jure belli et 
pacis.”  
84 For the Dutch and especially Witsian influence on Jones, see Whitehouse, “Intellectual and Textual 
Entrepôts,” esp. 566, 572. 
85 Although note Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, 45, which downplays the Dutch influence on 
Pufendorf: “Although it is right to associate neo-Stoicism with Lipsius’ enduring intellectual legacy to 
Leiden, yet in none of his numerous autobiographical allusions does Pufendorf refer to this period of 
his intellectual life as formative.”  
86  Jones’s dissenting academy produced some of the most notable eighteenth-century English 
dissenters, including Samuel Chandler (1693-1766), Jeremiah Jones (c. 1693-1724), Andrew Gifford 
(1700-84) and Daniel Scott (1694-1759). Not insignificantly, alongside Maddox, who was made 
Bishop of St. Asaph in 1738, Butler’s closest friend at Tewkesbury Thomas Secker (1693-1768) would 
also go on to become a prominent Anglican convert: he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 
1758.  
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Concerning Human Understanding (1690), 87  Shaftesbury’s ethics and Samuel 
Clarke’s (1675-1729) Boyle lectures.88 Extrapolating from this, it would be correct to 
say that Butler’s philosophy therefore drew from two distinct traditions: firstly the 
natural jurisprudential Grotian and Pufendorfian, and secondly the Newtonian natural 
theology of (especially) Clarke.  
The present author has elsewhere shown how Butler, by adjoining his 
Anglican pastoralism and his developing ‘science’ of social psychology, offered a 
profound contribution to economic discourse in early-eighteenth century Britain – a 
project his protégé Dean Tucker would ultimately see through to completion.89 Like 
Grotius and Pufendorf, Butler adopted a fundamentally anti-Epicurean conception of 
human nature, by means of equating human rationality with the social and benevolent 
affections. Additionally, because Butler accepted that self-love constituted one among 
a plurality of human affections, he hypothesised further that the moral authority of a 
‘Higher principle’ was required in order to mediate the inward motives and outward 
behaviour of human beings.90 In his famous correspondence with Clarke, the youthful 
Butler had spoken of this principle in vague and imprecise terms by ascribing a moral 
function to human nature which he claimed was a part of humanity’s ‘original frame 
and constitution’.91  By the time of Fifteen Sermons (1726), however, Butler had 
developed this kernel of a theory into a workable account of the conscience, which he 
thereafter equated with ‘Reason and cool Reflection’.92  
                                                            
87 The theoretical overlap between Pufendorf’s notion of imbecillitas and Locke’s discussion of human 
“uneasiness” as “the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action” (An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, II. XX-XXI) may have influenced Butler’s developing ideas. Cf. Pross, 
“Naturalism, anthropology, and culture,” 228. 
88 Later published as Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God; Clarke, A Discourse 
Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion. 
89 Price, “Liberty, Poverty and Charity.” 
90 Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1729), xvi. 
91 Quoted and discussed in Tennant, Conscience, Consciousness and Ethics, 33. 
92 Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 39; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 39.  
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According to Butler, the ‘superior Faculty’ of the conscience assisted humans 
in checking their ‘Immoderate Self-love’, thereby ensuring the cultivation and 
propagation of peaceable human society (à la Grotius) and the species at large (à la 
Pufendorf). 93  Taken together, these principles constituted what Butler called the 
‘Commerce of Humane Life’.94 Recognising, as Pufendorf before him, that self-love 
and sociability ‘ought by no means to be made opposites’,95 Butler likewise claimed 
that ‘Self-love and Benevolence, Virtue and Interest are not to be opposed’, his main 
point essentially being that human moral and material existence is unitary rather than 
dialectical:  
 
The Goodness or Badness of Actions does not arise from hence, that the Epithet, interested 
or disinterested, may be applied to them; [...] but from their being what they are; Namely, 
what becomes such Creatures as we are, what the state of the Case requires, or the 
contrary.96   
 
Again, just as Pufendorf had earlier noted that self-love and sociability ought to be 
placed ‘into the contrary Scale’,97 in Sermon XII ‘Upon the Love of our Neighbour’ 
Butler adopted precisely the same metaphor. ‘The whole System, as I may speak, of 
Affections’, Butler wrote: ‘The Case is here as in Scales: It is not one Weight, 
                                                            
93 Ibid., (1726), 209. The phrase “immoderate self-love” echoes Grotius’s statement in De Indis: “As 
for the [philautiá], which is classified as a vice – in other words, immoderate self-interest – it is an 
excess of such love.” Quotation and translation in Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 173. 
94 Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 190; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 190. 
95 Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and of Nations, II. III. XVI, 139. Also note 60 above. 
96 Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1729), xxix. Cf. Pufendorf’s claim (Of the Law of Nature and Nations, IV. 
IV. XIII, 376) that property and society arise naturally in process of time “according as the Temper or 
Condition of Men, the Nature of things themselves, and the difference of Place required.” 
97 Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and of Nations, II. III. XIII, 134. 
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considered in itself, which determines whether the Scale shall ascend or descend; but 
this depends on the Proportion, which that one Weight hath to the other’.98  
By measuring self-love and sociability one against the other in such fashion, 
then, Butler was evidently replicating the natural jurists’ respective adaptations of the 
Ciceronian ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis principle. Butler did, however, deviate 
from Grotius (in particular) in one important respect, in that he placed the theory of 
oikeiosis on a par with Revelation: 
 
[The] Scripture, not being a Book of Theory and Speculation, but a plain Rule of Life for 
Mankind, has with the utmost possible Propriety put the principle of Virtue upon the Love 
of our Neighbour; which is that Part of the Universe, that Part of Mankind, that Part of our 
Country, which comes under our immediate Notice, Acquaintance, and Influence, and 
with which we have to do.99 
 
Yet even here Butler was reiterating, to a profound extent, Pufendorf’s argument in 
Whole Duty of Man that religion was the ‘utmost and firmest Bond of Human Society’ 
(societatis vinculum).100  
As discussed above, the Grotian iteration of oikeiosis appeared to collapse the 
hitherto theologically strict hierarchical structure between God, humankind and 
animal, in the interests of peaceable corporeal society.101 However, by reinstating God 
as (quasi-Hobbesian) sovereign, Pufendorf reinstated the authority of divine law, 
maintaining – far more unequivocally than did Grotius – that man’s rational and 
                                                            
98 Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 236-7; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 242-3. 
99 Ibid., (1726), 229-30; (1729), 235-6.  
100 Pufendorf, Whole Duty of Man, I. IV. IX, 67-9.  
101 See esp. note 45 above. 
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sociable faculties as ‘distinct from Brutes’ was ‘endow’d’ by God.102 Nevertheless, 
because Pufendorf ultimately derived human society from the requirement of peace, 
stability and the cultivation of human society, his treatment of the relationship 
between God and conscience was in a sense secondary: a psychological-cum-meta-
ethical strait between divine and natural law, rather than constituting its end.103 By 
contrast, Butler was far more at pains to emphasise God’s superintendence over the 
oikeiosis process, primarily via the divinely-endued faculties of reason and reflection. 
Because of this, the Butlerian variant of commercial sociability ultimately depended 
on two distinct, yet interrelated, principles: firstly the notion of social harmony, or 
friendship, among humans (analogous to Grotius’s appetitus societatis and 
Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’); and second, the daily practice of loving God 
(αγαπη/love/agape).104 As we have seen, for the natural jurists (particularly Grotius) 
the former was the fundamental bedrock of the natural law. Conversely, for Butler, 
who was of course an Anglican latitudinarian cleric first and foremost and a 
metaphysician-cum-social theorist second, it was the latter. 
The psychological disparity between ‘self’ and ‘other’, and more importantly 
the role of the conscience in mediating the gamut of affections lying between the two 
poles, was discussed most exhaustively, then, in Fifteen Sermons. However, in an 
important chapter of The Analogy of Religion (1736), which was by far the more 
popular of the two works in Butler’s own day, the soon to be bishop of Bristol 
concocted a series of hypothetical scenarios underscoring his understanding of the 
                                                            
102 Pufendorf, Whole Duty of Man, I. I. II, 27.  
103 Ibid., 67, editor’s note 18. 
104 See, e.g., Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 269; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 276: “[Christianity] does not 
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oikeiosis process. Significantly, it was here too that Butler offered his schematic 
distinction between the ‘brute Creatures’ of the earth and the ‘Moral Government of 
God’ – a dichotomy which bore more than a passing resemblance to Pufendorf’s 
division between entia physica and entia moralia, and the paradoxical inferiority and 
superiority between humans and animals.  
According to Butler, whereas brutes are evidently of ‘superior Strength’ to 
men, it is the faculty of reason which gives the latter the ‘Advantage and Superiority 
over’ the former. To supplement his point, Butler then proposes the following. Firstly, 
suppose, Butler writes, that there are two or three men ‘in a desolate open Plain, 
attacked by ten times the number of Beasts of Prey’. Secondly, he writes, imagine a 
case in which rational and irrational creatures are ‘of like external Shape and 
Manner’. Finally, Butler asks the reader to consider the likely fate of several men who 
‘land on an Island inhabited only by wild Beasts’. In all three scenarios, Butler 
contends that, whether animals enjoy the numerical or physical advantage over 
humans, the latter can only survive and prosper if they utilise their rational and 
sociable instincts in the interests of the collective ‘Bonds of Union’: 
 
[A] Number of Men, who, by the Regulations of civil Government, the Inventions of Art, 
and the Experience of some Years … would be really sufficient, to subdue the wild Beasts, 
and to preserve themselves in Security from them […] So that rational Animals have not 
necessarily the [physical or numerical] Superiority over irrational ones; but, how 
improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that, in some [hypothetical] Globes, 
the latter may be superior …, [nevertheless] Reason has, in the nature of it, a Tendency to 
prevail over brute Force.105  
                                                            
105  Butler, The Analogy of Religion, 58-60. For an alternative interpretation of this purportedly 
“strange” passage, interpreted in “bizarre, Swiftian” and Augustan terms, see Tennant, Conscience, 
Consciousness and Ethics, 100-2. 
 36 
 
The final part of Butler’s scheme was thus to equate, unambiguously, the 
rational and sociable faculties of humans with God’s moral government. This he had 
delineated in Fifteen Sermons. ‘Brutes obey their Instincts of Principles of Action, 
according to certain Rules’, he wrote, ‘suppose the Constitution of their Body, and the 
Objects around them’. In turn this meant that animals were acting ‘suitably to their 
whole Nature’. Yet could the same quality be applied to human beings tout court, 
Butler pondered? Evidently not, for ‘Something further must be brought in to give us 
an adequate Notion of’ human nature, he wrote; ‘namely, that Conscience or 
Reflection, compared with [other affections and appetites] as they all stand together in 
the Nature of Man, plainly bears upon it Marks of Authority over all the rest’.106 
According to Butler, then, it is precisely because humans are inherently rational and 
sociable that they are ethical and virtuous creatures, capable of coexisting peacefully 
in spite of the increasing complexities, if not even ‘Inconveniencies’ and 
‘Incumbrances’, of new commercialised forms of social existence:  
 
Fear, Resentment, Compassion and others; of which there could be no such Occasion or 
Use in a perfect State: But in the present we should be exposed to greater Inconveniences 
without them ... They are Incumbrances indeed, but such as we are obliged to carry about 
with us, through this various Journey of Life.107 
 
Consequently, for Butler, whose philosophy prescribed to a basically 
Whiggish and pro-commercial understanding of the eighteenth-century church and 
state establishment, the oikeiosis principle was essentially tantamount to the defining 
                                                            
106 Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1729), xiii-xv. 
107 Ibid., (1726), 156; (1729), 156. 
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Christian principles of ‘love of self’, ‘love of other’ and ‘love of God’, intertwined.108 
Pufendorf’s ‘Bond of Human Society’ had now been rechristened ‘The Cements of 
Society’: a deliberately sanguine synonym for ‘commercial sociability’ in an 
increasingly materialistic, metropolitan – and indeed selfish – age.109  
 
5. ‘The Centrifugal and Centripetal Powers’: Bernard Mandeville and Josiah 
Tucker. 
 
Like Grotius and Pufendorf, Butler was of course no theorist of market economies. 
Rather, Fifteen Sermons was originally conceived as a theological-cum-meta-ethical 
rebuttal of Hobbesian realpolitik, alongside ‘this whole set of writers’ who appeared 
to be following, to a greater or lesser extent, in Hobbes’s wake.110 As Bob Tennant 
elaborates, this passage, which Butler introduced as part of a preface to the second 
edition of the sermons in 1729, housed many ‘references, explicit or implicit, to 
Clarke, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Locke, Wollaston, Fénelon, (and possibly Guyon), 
Bossuet, the Epicureans, Rochefoucauld … Cicero and the Stoics’, thereby providing 
a sense of the eclectic range of thinkers and ideas Butler was reacting to.111 Yet 
beyond the rather glaring omissions of Grotius and Pufendorf, Brooke adds further 
                                                            
108 Cf. Haakonssen, “Natural jurisprudence and the identity of the Scottish Enlightenment,” 270: “[…] 
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110 Fifteen Sermons (1729), viii-ix.  
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that an ‘absent presence on any such list’ was of course Bernard Mandeville (1670-
1733).112  
The socio-psychological analyses of Mandeville, the son of a Dutch physician 
who settled in England in the 1690s, are complex, multifaceted and at times 
incredibly subtle. Accordingly, they have been scrutinised in detail and at length in a 
number of important studies, and need not be repeated here.113 Yet what is significant 
from our present standpoint is a brief consideration of the satirist’s dual-status as the 
eighteenth-century populariser of Hobbes and as the heir of the Baylean Epicurean-
Augustinian model.114 This exposition is significant for two reasons: first, because it 
presents us with an interesting duplication of the Grotius-Hobbes-Pufendorf 
arrangement in an eighteenth-century British context; and second, because it serves as 
a springboard by which to analyse Tucker’s iteration of oikeiosis, which he did apply 
to a consideration of the market economy for the first time. 
As is well known, the recalcitrant strength of Mandeville’s position rested on 
his uncompromisingly pessimistic account of self-love, which he argued was basically 
tantamount to ‘avariciousness’. Just as Hobbes before him, Mandeville dismissed the 
Aristotelian/Grotian notion that man was the zōon politikon. Instead, he sought to 
dispel the myth (as he saw it) that either reason or religion was capable of controlling 
the irresistible ebb-and-flow of humanity’s baser passions. This being the case, 
Mandeville’s acerbic criticisms of commercial modernity rested on three fundamental 
premises. Firstly, they positioned notions of morality not anteriorly to society, but 
                                                            
112 Brooke, Philosophic Pride, 165. 
113 Both classic and recent studies/articles on Mandeville include Monroe, The Ambivalence of Bernard 
Mandeville; Horne, The Social and Political Thought of Bernard Mandeville; Goldsmith, Private 
Vices, Public Benefits; Castiglione, “Mandeville moralised”; Castiglione, “Considering Things 
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114 Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment, 144: “Mandeville … effectively ‘translated’ Bayle for 
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rather as the product of artifice and convention; second, they emphasised the 
centrality of the human passions and interests; and lastly, they argued that humans 
were therefore innately self-centred, egoistic and selfish creatures.  
On the one level, each of these properties was a clear re-articulation of 
Hobbes’s Epicurean-materialist scheme. Additionally, however, Mandeville’s system 
had also been filtered through an Augustinian and Baylean sieve, the result of which 
was a particularly malignant analysis of human nature and society. Claiming that the 
putative transition from the individualised ‘self’ towards collective ‘society’ was 
fundamentally precarious, chaotic and ‘anti-social’ in nature, the Dutch-native 
speculated that the human instinct for survival was a matter of indirect influence, in 
the guise of flattery, persuasion, coercion and so on. Nevertheless, as far as 
Mandeville was concerned, there must have been some sort of providentialist 
explanation for this sequence of events since, given the vagaries of self-love, the 
unlikely formation of civil society could surely only be said to have transpired ‘from 
God, by miracle’.115 Hence the ‘doctrine of Epicurus’, Mandeville surmised, ‘that 
every thing is deriv’d from the Concourse and fortuitous Jumble of Atoms’ was only 
half of the explanation as to the origin of human social organisation.116 The rest must, 
therefore, be attributable – à la Nicole and Bayle – to God’s redemptive plan. 
Mandeville’s system, and particularly its infamous exaltation of luxury and 
vice as the two main drivers of material progress, was clearly a dagger to the heart of 
the British commercial establishment. For, by fastening his Baylean-inspired scheme 
to the ‘Epicurean motif’, as Blom has usefully termed it,117 Mandeville positioned 
himself squarely at odds with idealistic, quasi-Stoic defences of the post-1688 
                                                            
115 Mandeville, Fable of the bees, II, 205. 
116 Ibid., II, 310. 
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commercial order associated with the likes of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Joseph 
Addison (1672-1719), Richard Steele (1672-1729) and William Law (1686-1761) 
among others. As we have seen, Butler’s Fifteen Sermons was of course one such 
Stoic response to Mandeville, and perhaps the most potent given that it drew equally 
from Clarke’s epistemology in order to deal with Mandeville’s arguments on their 
own terms. Yet as these pages argue further, by drawing the psychological 
mechanisms of oikeiosis firmly within the Christian framework, this enabled Butler to 
confute Hobbes and Mandeville’s radically reductionist interpretation of man as a 
passion-led and self-centred animal, while also fastening onto a strategy long-
established by Grotius and Pufendorf to counter the sceptical arguments of their own 
day. As we shall see, it was precisely this iteration of Stoic oikeiosis that Tucker 
adopted as the basis for his developing science of political economy.  
Tucker’s most conspicuous engagement with the oikeiosis principle appears in 
the ‘Preliminary Discourse’ to the unfinished Elements of Commerce and Theory of 
Taxes (1755), a work which was originally intended as didactic material for the then 
Prince of Wales and future King George III (1738-1820).118 Initially conceding that 
humans ‘hath the Appetites of an Animal’, Tucker observes that as rational agents, 
they also have the additional ‘Temper and Affections’ of social beings. By the 
‘gracious Contrivance of the Author of Nature’, he continues, providence has 
ordained that humans require mutual assistance in life in order to procure 
‘Improvements’ within society. This is clearly important to them, Tucker posits, 
because just as nature intends that humans seek food in order to appease their appetite 
of hunger, so too does it prompt them to seek to better the society in which they live 
in order to ‘gratify’ their corresponding ‘social Instincts’. Tucker calls this the human 
                                                            
118 Shelton, Dean Tucker, 88. 
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‘Prerogative’—that is to say, our ‘Set of social and benevolent Affections’—and what 
is more, he concludes, it is this familiar characteristic which most distinguishes us 
from the beasts.119 
In this opening passage, Tucker is clearly alluding to Butler’s insistence in 
Fifteen Sermons that the prospect of peaceable society is a fortuitous-cum-
providential outcome of unintended consequences:  
 
[As] Persons without any Conviction from Reason of the desirableness of Life, would yet 
of Course preserve it merely from the Appetite of Hunger; so by acting merely from 
Regard (suppose) to Reputation, without any Consideration of the Good of others, Men 
often contribute to publick Good.120  
 
Additionally, however, Tucker both qualifies and furthers Butler’s initial premise by 
admitting, far more readily than does his mentor, that society is potentially the chief 
cause of humanity’s woes, and therefore a double-edged sword. For though society 
may be the ‘best Means of procuring a Supply for [our] animal or natural Wants’, 
Tucker writes, so too does society entice us towards our desirous, passionate and 
multitudinous ‘artificial Needs’; and here Tucker is referring primarily to the excesses 
of luxury, which he believes are the by-products of our own and others’ misdirected 
self-love. In Tucker’s view, self-love is evidently ‘narrow and confined in its Views’, 
so that if it is left with no ‘Direction or Controll’ it will eventually ‘defeat its own 
Ends’ until ‘even Self-interest is loser’. 121  However if directed into its proper 
                                                            
119 Tucker, The Elements of Commerce and Theory of Taxes. “A Preliminary Discourse, Setting Forth 
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insight into Pufendorf’s similar treatment of the disparities and similarities between animal and human 
nature, see Of The Law of Nature and Nations, II. I. VI, 97-8. 
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channels, Tucker insists that self-love will serve the public good in ways which far 
exceed individual enterprise: 
 
[The] first ... Wants of Mankind [are] much better supplied by dividing the general Labour 
into different Branches, than if each Individual depended on himself alone for the Supply 
of [them.] And this [portioning out] of the common Labour [gives rise to] distinct Trades 
and Manufactures; and may therefore be considered ... [the] Rudiments of Commerce.  
[... Therefore] as our present secular Happiness appears to arise from the Enjoyment 
of superior Wealth, Power, Honour, Pleasure, or Preferment, SELF-LOVE, the great 
mover of created Beings, determines each Individual to aspire after these social Goods, 
and to use the most probable Means of obtaining them.122 
 
On the one hand, Tucker’s analysis in this passage is a clear anticipation of 
Smith’s famous iteration of the division of labour, 123  which had had numerous 
historical antecedents ranging from Plato to, more recently, William Petty (1620-
1687) and Mandeville himself. Viewed from the opposite chronological perspective, 
however, Tucker’s model is also none other than a Butlerian adaptation of 
Pufendorf’s foundational imbecillitas—indigentia—cultura argument.124 Specifically 
Tucker’s ‘first wants’—‘rudiments of commerce’—‘artificial needs’ configuration is 
plainly analogous to Pufendorf’s theory that (a) individual weakness and self-
preservation (b) leads humans to thirst for the superfluities of life, which (c) 
precipitates human industry, the portioning of labour and sociality.125 At the same 
time, however, as an Anglican prelate, Tucker adheres most dutifully to Butler’s 
brand of neo-Stoicism: as when he states that in order to ameliorate (on a societal 
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123 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, I. I – I. III, 13-36. 
124 Esp. Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and Nations, II. II. II; Whole Duty of Man, II. I. IV.  
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level) the worst excesses of ‘inordinate Self-love’, the Butlerian ‘Counter-Agent[s]’ of 
‘REASON and REFLECTION’ must always be called on to ‘Aid the social and 
benevolent Principle’:  
 
[So that] when the auxiliary Motives of Reason are called in Aid of social Love, or 
diffusive Benevolence, this latter becomes, in a good degree, a Counter-Agent to 
inordinate Self-Love. So that the Circulation of Commerce may be conceived to proceed 
from the Impulse of two distinct Principles of Action in Society, analogous to the 
centrifugal and centripetal Powers in the Planetary System.126 
 
As these passages make clear, then, Tucker’s political economy ought to be 
construed as the theoretical highpoint of the oikeiosis trajectory chronicled within 
these pages. Snaking its way from Grotius and Pufendorf to Butler and Tucker—via 
crucial ‘concessionary’ detours through Hobbes’s state of nature and Mandeville’s 
post-lapsarian ‘Grumbling Hive’—Tucker’s ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ powers, 
clearly borrowing from Newton’s Principia, are tantamount to the ‘opposing’ 
principles of self-love and sociability, in a didactic repetition of Grotius’s 
foundational ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis argument. For it is plain to see that 
within the Tuckerian scheme, self-love is analogous to the centripetal power within 
human nature, tending naturally and therefore legitimately towards the innermost, 
‘egoistic’ self. Concomitantly, sociability is the centrifugal power (again, conceived 
as the Grotian appetitus societatis or Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’), tending away from the 
innermost self towards what Forman-Barzilai has termed, albeit in the context of 
Smith’s economic thought, the ‘commercial cosmopolis’.127  
                                                            
126  Tucker, Elements, “Preliminary Discourse,” 8. Tucker’s reference to “diffusive Benevolence” 
recalls Hierocles’s explanation of oikeiosis as a series of concentric circles. 
127 The phrase is Forman-Barzilai’s, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, chap. 6. 
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Once again, however, just as in Butler’s example, Tucker’s conclusory act was 
to draw Grotius and Pufendorf’s theoretical foundations firmly within the Whiggish-
cum-Anglican context. Borrowing from Pufendorf’s distinction between entia physica 
and entia moralia, and similarly from the Butlerian dichotomy between ‘Brute 
Creation’ and ‘Moral Government’, in the first instance Tucker proclaimed that God 
was ‘governor’ of both ‘natural [i.e., corporeal] Government’ and ‘MORAL 
GOVERNMENT’. Continuing in a Butlerian vein, Tucker insisted further, however, 
that because rational creatures were evidently ‘moral Agents’, they were duty-bound 
to mediate between the natural (self-preservative) and moral (sociable) worlds, in due 
proportion to the ‘natural Stint and Bound’ of their individual and collective social 
affections. 128 Only in so doing, he concluded, could individuals locate their rightful 
place as fully socialised and ethical creatures within ‘this wonderful Fabrick’ of ‘the 
divine Oeconomy’.129  
It is interesting to note that, like Butler, Tucker nowhere acknowledged 
Pufendorf’s influence (nor did he make any overt mention, incidentally, of Hobbes). 
By contrast, in the penultimate section of his magnum opus The Treatise Concerning 
Civil Government (1781), the clergyman was explicit about Grotius’s legacy. Written 
primarily against British rational dissenters, North American revolutionaries and the 
‘metaphysical’130 doctrine of universal natural rights which undergirded their various 
philosophies, Tucker laid contemporary calls for parliamentary reform and relief from 
the Test and Corporation Acts squarely at the feet of Locke.131 By contrast, placing 
Grotius alongside Aristotle and Cicero for the ancients and Richard Hooker (1554-
                                                            
128 “Stint and Bound” is attributable to Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 210; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 
212.  
129 Tucker, Seventeen Sermons, 26. 
130 Tucker, Four Letters on Important National Subjects, 23.  
131 Tucker, A Letter to Edmund Burke, 11: “They are now MR. LOCKE’S Disciples: [whose] … 
Maxims … if … executed to the Letter … would necessarily unhinge, and destroy every government 
upon Earth.”  
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1600) for the moderns, Tucker invoked the Dutch jurist’s work in a staunch defence 
of the established political order based on ‘limitted Monarchy, and Constitutional, 
(though not … Republican) Whigg[ism]’. 132  Tellingly, it was the famous 
oikeiosis/appetitus societatis passage from Rights of War and Peace Tucker saw fit to 
quote,133 after which he adduced that  
 
according to the Testimony of GROTIUS, Mankind are naturally inclined … to join in a 
social State, and to partake in the Blessings of a Body Politic … For [in] every Page, and 
every Line of his Treatise, concerning the Rights of War and Peace … he demonstrates … 
that private Subjects … are bound in Duty to pay a prompt and willing Obedience to all 
the Laws of [the] State … by which they are protected, except in those unhappy Cases … 
where the Laws of the State are manifestly and directly repugnant to the Laws of Nature, 
and of God.134 
 
Tucker’s invocation of Grotius in the Treatise leads us finally, then, to the 
clergyman’s decidedly Pufendorfian conclusion about the role and content of the 
natural law within his economic scheme. As has been shown elsewhere,135 at its core 
Tucker’s political economy was premised on the unavoidability of social 
subordination, rank and hierarchy as necessary prerequisites of modern commercial 
societies. It was for this very reason that his socioeconomics was wedded so firmly to 
his defence of existing structures in church and state. In consequence, Tucker 
reproached the doctrine of inalienable universal rights on the basis that it superseded 
the natural and civilisational principles and protocols of economic progress. As J. G. 
A. Pocock demonstrated over three decades ago, Tucker’s stance on this score was 
                                                            
132 Tucker, A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, III. I, 400, 409. 
133 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, I. V-VI, 79-81. See note 25 above. 
134 Tucker, A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, III. I, 399-400.  
135 Price, “Liberty, Poverty and Charity.”  
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borne out of his wholesale rejection of (in his view) the fundamentally ‘unhistorical 
character’ of the ‘Lockean compact’, resulting from the erroneous (because ‘anti-
social’) ‘divorce of the individual from society brought about by the substitution of 
natural right for natural law’.136 As these pages have articulated further, however, 
Tucker’s position owed a substantial, if not fundamental, debt to Pufendorf’s fictive 
state of nature as outlined above.137 For whereas Hobbes and Locke, despite their 
differing conclusions, contended that a state of natural equality did exist among the 
earliest roaming families, 138  conversely, Pufendorf’s state of nature confirmed 
Tucker’s contrasting view that hierarchies were natural to human beings tout court, 
whether in pre-civil or in advanced commercial societies. Consequently, for Tucker, 
history taught that ‘[h]umans were naturally sociable and unequal, yet mutually 
needy, some naturally submissive, some not; this was quite enough to account for and 
legitimate the emergence of both political society and hierarchy without “tedious 
[and] uncertain experiments” in contractualism’.139  
In closing we might add that, as far as Tucker was concerned, this explanation 
was also quite enough to account for the emergence of commercial society in tandem 
with the political. For, again as Pocock succinctly worded it, Tucker’s economic 
scheme was premised—perhaps uniquely, because unequivocally, among his 
contemporaries—on the fundamental basis that ‘the principles of economic progress 
                                                            
136 Pocock, “Josiah Tucker on Burke, Locke and Price,” 170-1. 
137 See notes 72-4 above. 
138 Hobbes, Leviathan, I. XIV, 146: “[I]t followeth, that in such a condition, every man has the right to 
every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of every man to 
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man ... of living out the time, which Nature 
ordinarily allow men to live.” Locke, Second Treatise of Government, II. §. 5: 9: “The state of nature 
has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and … teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty 
or possessions.” 
139 Hampsher-Monk, “British Radicalism and the anti-Jacobins,” 672-3; summarising and quoting from 
Tucker, A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, II. I, 124-8, 134, 137. 
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are those of natural law’.140 Be that as it may, as this essay has attempted to inculcate 
in addition to this analysis, the Tuckerian variant of the natural law was decidedly 
Grotian, Pufendorfian and Butlerian in its orientation, constituting the highpoint of the 
hierarchical oikeiosis process: 
 
Being such a beautiful and infinite Variety of Creatures one above another in the Scale of 
Life … It can surely be no Wrong to me, that I am not created an Angel: Nor is it any 
Injury to the Brute that he not made a Man. All Creatures were never intended to be of the 
highest Order  … Subordinations, Gradations, and Dependancies throughout the whole 
System of Being; if the glorious Attributes and Perfections of the Deity are thereby more 
effectually displayed; if the Beauty of the whole Frame of Nature is rendered more grand 
and august by such a rich Variety; and if the Foundation of relative and social Duties 
require such a Constitution in the moral World; then consequently some must be higher, 
and some lower in the Order and Scale of Things: All cannot be alike, where it is required 
there should be so great a Diversity.141  
 
6. Conclusion. 
 
Building primarily on Hont’s thesis regarding the intellectual dynamic between 
Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf, this essay has attempted to advance two core 
arguments which require highlighting in conclusion. The first is to assert that the 
eighteenth-century ‘science of man’, revolving around a new ethics of commercial 
                                                            
140 Pocock, “Josiah Tucker on Burke, Locke and Price,” 185; emphasis added. 
141 Tucker, Seventeen Sermons, 19-20. Cf. Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and Nations, II. I. VI-V, 
97-99: “Brute Creatures … are plac’d below our Degree of Being […] because GOD Almighty has not 
given them a Mind capable of the Knowledge of Right and Law. […] The Dignity of Man … above all 
other Parts of the animal World, made it requisite that his Actions should be squar’d by some Rule; 
without which no Order, no Decorum, no Beauty can be conceiv’d. Hence it is his greatest Honour that 
he has obtain’d an immortal Soul, endu’d with the Light of Understanding, with the Faculties of 
judging and of choosing Things, and with an admirable Capacity for Arts and Knowledge.” 
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sociability (or ‘unsocial sociability’) 142  and typically associated with the Scottish 
contribution to economic and social theory, can initially be traced back to Grotius’s 
foundational ideas in Rights of War and Peace. By itself this observation is hardly 
novel: in fact, it borders on a virtual tautology. Yet whereas recent analyses have 
tended to treat the ‘unsocial sociability’ trope in dichotomous ‘Epicurean-Augustinian 
versus Stoic’ terms,143 typically emphasising the predominance of the former over the 
latter, the novelty of this paper is that it has attempted to recast the debate, however 
tentatively, as a theoretical propagation of Grotius’s distinctive ‘personal’ and ‘social’ 
oikeiosis argument.144 This said, the article’s second main claim is that eighteenth-
century British political economy ought not to be framed in exclusively Scottish, 
moderately secularising and primarily self-interest-based terms. 145  Rather, by 
examining the kinship between Grotius and Pufendorf’s, and Butler and Tucker’s, 
respective iterations of the oikeiosis mechanism, these pages validate the existence of 
an alternative neo-Stoic trajectory, resulting in an overtly sociability-based Christian 
political economy. 
What is the broader significance of this? The first answer to this question rests 
on the need to acknowledge Butler and Tucker’s theological contributions to 
eighteenth-century economic discourse and indeed the Scottish Enlightenment, which 
has hitherto remained underemphasised. Hont, for example, argued that whatever was 
left of Christian theology in Smith’s conception of commercial society was merely 
                                                            
142  The famous phrase is Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) in Idea for a Universal History with a 
cosmopolitan aim, 111: “[By] ‘antagonism’ [I refer to] the unsociable sociability of human beings, i.e. 
their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance 
that constantly threatens to break up this society ... it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of 
the human being ... thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture ... thus all talents ... 
[and] taste is formed.”  
143 An excellent summary of the recent literature is Dew, “Epicurean and Stoic Enlightenments.” 
144 The present author is particularly indebted to Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature, 83-102, 
for enriching this aspect of the essay’s argument. 
145 On these points in general consult Young, “Christianity, Commerce, and the Canon.” 
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vestigial, and essentially a rejection, of Hutcheson’s neo-Stoic teachings.146 Similarly, 
Hume’s attempts to grapple with, and ultimately disown, Hutcheson’s Christian 
Stoicism are well documented.147 Yet, while it is important not to overstate Butler and 
Tucker’s influence, it is nevertheless worth remembering that the pair were much 
lauded among the Scottish moralists, and not least Hutcheson himself. Indeed, 
Hutcheson, Hume and Lord Kames (1696-1782) all spoke admiringly of Butler in 
their published writings.148 Similarly, Tucker corresponded with Hume and Kames in 
the 1750s and 1760s on various issues related to trade and commerce, though most 
notably on the reciprocal dynamics between rich and poor countries in an increasingly 
competitive global market (indeed it is in this respect alone that Hont associates 
Tucker’s Christian providentialism with the Scottish Enlightenment).149 Thus, when 
Hume wrote to Kames of Tucker’s ideas that, ‘conformable to the character both of a 
divine and a philosopher, [he] draws an argument from the goodness of providence; 
but I think it may be turned against him’,150  we note the Scottish philosopher’s 
acknowledgement of Tucker’s Christian Stoic naturalism – albeit steeped in the 
scepticism for which Hume remains notorious. Viewed from yet another perspective, 
Tucker’s economic writings from the period exhibit traces of the conjectural history – 
indeed, the ‘Four-Stages Theory’ of societal development which Hont refers to as the 
endpoint of the Pufendorfian scheme – for which many of the Scottish school were 
                                                            
146 Hont, “Jealousy of Trade,” 39; Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, 19, goes so far as to label 
Smith a “dissident pupil of Hutcheson.” 
147 Stewart, “The Stoic Legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment”; Moore, “Utility and Humanity.” 
148 Most recently acknowledged in Oslington, “Anglican Social Thought and the Shaping of Political 
Economy in Britain,” 29. 
149  Hont, “‘The Rich Country-Poor Country’ Debate in the Scottish Enlightenment.” Cf. Dickey, 
“Doux-commerce and humanitarian values,” 288-90. 
150 Greig, ed., The Letters of David Hume, Hume to Kames, 4th March 1758, 271. 
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shortly to become famous.151 We would do well to note, for instance, some striking 
similarities between Tucker’s historico-commercial analyses and that of William 
Robertson (1721-93). On closer inspection, it is no coincidence to find that the 
Presbyterian Robertson had also been schooled, like Butler, by a former student of 
Leiden, Charles Mackie (1688-1770).152 
The second answer to the above query obliges us to revisit Smith’s conception 
of oikeiosis. In a chapter in The Theory of Moral Sentiments entitled ‘Of licentious 
systems’, Smith reformulated the ‘self-interest–sociability’ conundrum in terms of the 
disparity between ‘partiality’–‘impartiality’, which, crucially, was modelled on the 
philosophical contrast between Mandeville and Butler’s respective taxonomies.153 Put 
very briefly, here Smith characterised Mandeville’s ‘licentious system’ as that which 
fashioned the ‘indulgent and partial spectator’: the individual who only yielded to a 
higher political authority because their vanity and self-love had been appealed to. 
Conversely, Smith’s Butler-inspired ‘impartial spectator’—the individual of genuine 
‘self-command’, who was capable of looking beyond their narrow self-interest 
towards the public good—was the figure truly worthy of emulation.154
 
It has not 
escaped notice that Smith’s conception of the ‘impartial spectator’ in this, and in other 
sections, of Moral Sentiments positioned the Scottish philosopher ‘very close to ... 
                                                            
151 See, e.g., Tucker, A Brief Essay on … Trade; Tucker, Naturalization of Foreign Protestants … I; 
Tucker, Naturalization of Foreign Protestants … II; Tucker, An Apology for the Present Church of 
England. 
152  Phillipson, “Providence and progress,” esp. 72-3. Tucker was an avid reader and admirer of 
Robertson. In a footnote to A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, I. II, 170, which precipitates 
discussion about the analogous relationship between native Americans and the pre-societal state of 
nature, he recommends Robertson’s History of America, I. IV. 
153 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, I. III. I, 53; VII. II. III, 363-4. Smith simultaneously praises and 
lambasts Mandeville as a “lively and humorous,” though “coarse and rustic” writer, whose “notions … 
[were] in almost every respect erroneous,” whereas he compliments Butler as a “late ingenious and 
subtle philosopher.”  
154 Ibid., VI. II. IV, 361-71. 
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Butler’s account of conscience’, 155  thereby revealing him at his ‘most Stoic’. 156 
Adjacently, it has also long been acknowledged that Smith owned several of Tucker’s 
tracts in his private library; and while the Elements of Commerce is not listed among 
them,157 A. M. C. Waterman points out that there is nevertheless good reason to 
suggest that Smith did read the tract given the ‘many traces of Tucker’s Butlerian 
view of the human condition’ in Moral Sentiments, penned merely three years later.158 
This said, it is a distinct possibility that Smith’s treatment of oikeiosis was modelled 
on the Butlerian and Tuckerian iteration.159
 
To conclude, then, in this paper we have demonstrated an intriguing 
eighteenth-century ‘re-enactment’ of the Grotius-Hobbes-Pufendorf dynamic, in the 
guise of the Butler-Mandeville-Tucker configuration. Recognised the ferocity of the 
compulsions of Mandevillean self-love, in a mirror-image of Pufendorf’s earlier 
concession to Hobbesian self-preservation, Tucker nevertheless ultimately sided with 
Butler, just as Pufendorf did Grotius. It is in this vein that Laurence Dickey 
summarises Tucker’s economic scheme as “a modernization of the oikeiosis process 
and a Christianization of it,” in which he “reinforces in the name of Christian morality 
and Christian providentialism what Cicero had philosophically sanctioned in his 
discussion of oikeiosis and Grotius and Pufendorf in their natural law versions of the 
                                                            
155 Ibid., III. III. V. 191-2, editor’s note 54. This falls under a section and chapter entitled “Of the 
influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of 
the Deity.” 
156 Haakonssen and Whatmore, “Commerce and Enlightenment,” 300. 
157 Mizuta, Adam Smith’s Library, 147-8. 
158 Waterman, “The Changing Theological Context of Economic Analysis,” 129-30. 
159 Cf. notes 9, 11, 12 above. Interestingly, Forman-Barzilai (Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, 
chap. 1) does note Butler’s influence on this aspect of Smith’s thought; however, she ignores Tucker 
entirely and pairs Butler instead with Nicole. Alternatively, for a statement of Smith and Tucker’s 
equal (or near-equal) significance as “historicist” theorists at the close of early modernity, in which 
they personify the “essentially conservative Whig Enlightenment at its most intellectual adventurous; at 
the high point of its grasp of history,” see Pocock, “Political Thought in the English-speaking Atlantic 
1760-1790: (i),” 264, 265, 275, 278; Pocock, “Political Thought in the English-speaking Atlantic 1760-
1790:  (ii),” 283, 291, (quotation at) 294, 301, 303. 
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sociability argument.”160 While it is undoubtedly correct, then, to draw theoretical 
parallels between the seventeenth-century jurisconsults and the eighteenth-century 
Scottish political economists, as Hont did and others continue to do, this paper has 
shown that there are adjacent narratives, trajectories and lines of inquiry which 
require our attention. Butler and Tucker are one such example of this; no doubt there 
are others yet to be exposed.  
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